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CONTRACT TEXTS, CONTRACT TEACHING, 
CONTRACT LAW: COMMENT ON LAWRENCE 
CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD 
Brian H. Bix* 
Abstract: Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World offers a good starting 
place for necessary conversations about how contract law should be taught, and, more 
generally, for when and how cases—in summary form or in longer excerpts—are useful in 
teaching the law. This Article tries to offer some reasons for thinking that their prevalence 
may reflect important truths about contract law in particular and law and legal education in 
general. 
INTRODUCTION 
Those of us who have been teaching law for a long time, and have 
been teaching contract law for a long time, are experts of a sort about 
teaching that subject. Just ask us—we’ll tell you. We are also—most of 
us, anyway—complete amateurs. Few among us have done, for example, 
any empirical work about the relative benefits of different kinds of 
casebooks or different kinds of teaching styles. I belong to the general 
majority of law professors who can only offer armchair speculations. 
And like the general majority of law professors, I will not allow the lack 
of informed expertise to prevent me from expressing opinions—lots of 
them, and with unwarranted confidence. 
In this article, I will use Lawrence Cunningham’s wonderful book, 
Contracts in the Real World,1 as the starting point for some reflections 
on contract law textbooks, teaching contract law, and contract law itself. 
Part I considers what one might learn from a broad overview of contract 
law texts. Part II offers a brief defense of using more full judicial 
opinions (or at least substantial excerpts), rather than case summaries or 
simply lists of doctrinal rules, in teaching contract law. Part III offers 
some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of using cases 
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota Law School. 
Many of my biases on both Contract Law and teaching Contract Law are on display in BRIAN H. 
BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT (2012). I am grateful for the comments and 
suggestions of the editors of this journal. 
1. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR 
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012). 
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involving well-known persons and events in contract law texts. 
I. CONTRACT TEXTS 
In looking for texts on contract law, there are two major alternative 
categories. On one hand are the type of texts that have been used to 
teach contract law since contract law scholar and Harvard Law School 
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell first put forward the basic 
theoretical and pedagogical idea over a century ago2: course-books that 
are basically case-books. Such texts are primarily lightly edited versions 
of reported judicial opinions, generally from appellate courts.3 Because 
of the influence of the American legal realists, who criticized the belief 
that legal reasoning could or should rely entirely on the analysis of 
cases, we now have some discussions of policy and theory interspersed 
with the cases.4 However, most of the pages in these course-books 
remain devoted to the texts of actual opinions. 
On the other hand are treatises, where the text contains primarily 
declarations of the doctrinal rules.5 To a varying extent, a treatise may 
also contain quick summaries of some of the more important or 
instructive cases. Study aids6 tend to have the general structure of 
treatises, though on a smaller scale, focusing on declaring the rules, with 
occasional reference to case summaries.7 
2. For an overview of Langdell’s approach to law and legal education see, for example, Thomas 
C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
3. E.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (8th ed. 2012); RANDY E. 
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (4th ed. 2008); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., 
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2013); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2012); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. 
CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2013); DANIEL MARKOVITS, 
CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL METHODS (2012); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT 
LAW AND THEORY (5th ed. 2013). 
4. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. 
Reed eds., 1993) (giving excerpts from realist writers, indicating their views on legal realism, 
judging, legal education, and other topics); BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 
193–204 (6th ed. 2012) (overview of legal realism). 
5. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2011); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009). 
6. E.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(7th ed. 2013); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 2009); CLAUDE D. 
ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL (7th ed. 2010). 
7. One can also find texts—especially among books devoted primarily to the drafting of 
contracts—that provide the sort of problem-based approach more commonly associated with 
business school courses. E.g., SUE PAYNE, BASIC CONTRACT DRAFTING ASSIGNMENTS: A 
NARRATIVE APPROACH (2011); DAVID ZARFES & MICHAEL L. BLOOM, CONTRACTS: A 
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That summaries of cases—and predominantly reported appellate 
cases—still dominate teaching texts in contract law (and most other first-
year law school courses) is itself an interesting story. The standard 
progress story of the history of American legal thought8 is that the legal 
realists showed: (1) that formalist approaches to legal reasoning and 
judicial reasoning were unsustainable—based inevitably on bias and pre-
judgment; (2) that legal reasoning was not really autonomous; and (3) 
that even if legal reasoning could be autonomous, it would be better if 
supplemented by policy, science, and other forms of wisdom from 
outside of law. 
The legal realist critique left its mark on legal education, though how 
large an impact it had can reasonably be debated. Is it an important 
change or a trivial one that our texts are no longer subtitled “Cases on 
Contracts,” but now are subtitled “Cases and Materials on Contracts”?9 
As reflected in these texts, the vast majority of contract law courses go 
beyond mere close reading of the judicial opinions, adding some amount 
of economic analysis, contract theory, critical reflections, and whatever 
else might fit under the broad realist rubric of “policy.” At the same 
time, most contract law course-books and most contract law courses 
continue to rely primarily on the close reading of judicial opinions, and 
primarily opinions from appellate courts.10 Whatever “policy,” 
theoretical, or inter-disciplinary content is present is marginal. At the 
same time, an observer sympathetic to the lessons of legal realism would 
note that it is a sign of realism’s success that first-year law school 
courses now, almost universally, no longer focus exclusively on cases. 
The courses, as taught, now support the view that non-doctrinal 
arguments are proper subjects of study in a law school and that these 
extra-legal (non-doctrinal) arguments are both appropriate and, in the 
hardest cases, likely inescapable. 
One can come at the same set of questions about the role of cases in 
understanding contract law from the other direction. Even (or especially) 
when we are not worried about the teaching of first-year law students, it 
is still hard to escape individual cases entirely. As mentioned, treatises 
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH (2011). However, these approaches remain very much a small 
minority, especially in the texts used for first-year contract law courses. 
8. I confess to being guilty of contributing to or reinforcing this narrative. See BIX, supra note 4, 
at 193–204. 
9. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 3 (“Cases and Materials” in subtitle of textbook); 
KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3 (same). 
10. In a growing number of courses the traditional focus on the close reading of cases is now 
supplemented by contract drafting exercises. 
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(and even most study aids) contain some case summaries, however 
condensed. It is worth considering why this role for cases (in full 
opinions, excerpted opinions, or summaries) remains so pervasive. Is it 
merely the residue of Langdellian formalism that we lack the energy or 
courage to finally shake off? 
Perhaps the persistence of cases in course-books (including Contracts 
in the Real World) could be explained in terms of pedagogy. Even if one 
did not accept the Langdellian view, one still might believe that first-
year law school courses are meant to teach not only the doctrinal rules of 
the courses in question, but also to teach certain basic skills: for 
example, how to read cases and how to argue within a precedential 
system (using prior cases as authority, or distinguishing prior cases, 
among other skills). Contracts in the Real World in fact takes the 
students through their paces this way in a fairly effective manner. For 
example, at one point the book offers the following question of analysis: 
how does a couple in a separation agreement making a mutual mistake 
about the value of shares of a not-yet-discovered Ponzi scheme fit into a 
line of cases involving mutual mistakes about whether a rare dime was 
forged, whether a violin was in fact a Stradivarius, and whether a cow 
was in fact barren?11 
Accepting that one use for cases in course-books is to help train 
students in different kinds of case analysis, one suspects that the ubiquity 
of case excerpts and summaries in both course-books and treatises 
reflects something beyond pedagogical value for training students to 
“think like a lawyer.” In part, the presence of cases may reflect a 
different aspect of teaching: that certain doctrines cannot be clearly 
explained without examples. Consider the following “black-letter rule,” 
taken from the Second Restatement: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the 
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is 
discharged, unless the language or the circumstance indicate the 
contrary.12 
We can put aside for the moment that the text (like other provisions in 
the Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code) looks like it was 
badly translated from the Latin.13 How should such a rule be applied? 
11. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 59–66. 
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).  
13. I do not mean to be too critical. As someone who has worked as a Reporter on a proposed 
uniform law (the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act), this author knows only too well 
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What is meant by “impracticable” and an event’s non-occurrence being 
“a basic assumption on which [a] contract is made”? The doctrine begins 
to take clearer shape when we see a case in which the doctrine was held 
inapplicable to a situation where a Fortune 500 company was losing two 
million dollars a day.14 And the Restatement itself is a document that 
understands the need for, or at least the value of, examples, as almost 
every Restatement section is followed by short “illustrations” (the 
impracticability section just quoted is followed by six “comments” and 
sixteen “illustrations”). 
Additionally, I would speculate that the prevalence of case summaries 
likely reflects a number of considerations, including an uncertainty or 
flexibility intrinsic, if not to all law all of the time, at least to certain 
areas of law. The great cases contain rich facts that ground conflicting 
moral principles and intuitions. Sometimes these cases are open to 
different interpretations that would justify quite different ways of 
applying the “rule” of that case to subsequent cases. At other times, it is 
not that the meaning of the case is uncertain so much as the clash of 
interests, values, and arguments is so nicely poised in the case, and the 
conflict so well-handled in the opinion, that the case repays frequent re-
reading.15 It is not an accident that cases like Hadley v. Baxendale,16 
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,17 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. 
International Sales Corp.,18 and Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell 
Oil Co.19 appear in almost every contract law course-book and treatise, 
almost always with extensive quotations from the opinion, or at least an 
how hard it is to draft language that is both precise and understandable; and, in legal documents, it 
is usually the clarity that gets sacrificed first (and properly so). 
14. Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112, 1117 (6th Cir. 1991). And 
it may round out the complexities of the doctrine further to note that in the case both the trial court 
and a dissenting judge on appeal thought that the doctrine was in principle applicable to those facts. 
Id. at 1124 (Ryan, J., dissenting). This case is used by a number of contract law course-books. See, 
e.g., KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 691–700. 
15. From the point of view of law professors, who often teach the same cases, year after year, 
over the course of decades, there is obvious value to cases that do not become stale upon the 20th 
reading and public discussion. (One knows the uncharitable excuse for frequent new editions of 
course-books—that they are meant to force students to buy new books rather than used copies—but 
new editions may also be an unintended mercy for the teachers, who might otherwise be unable to 
bring any interest or energy to lesser cases that have been taught too many times before. Changing 
many “second-tier” cases every few years, through the revised editions, helps veteran teachers make 
it through a few more repetitions of the same course.) 
16. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.  
17. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
18. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
19. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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extensive paraphrase of the case’s facts. These are cases that both 
students and contract law scholars can argue about endlessly, without 
reaching any consensus either about the rightness of the result or about 
the “lessons” that should be drawn from the cases. There is a sense that 
there are subtleties and nuances and uncertainties within the law that 
cannot be reduced to clear and clean descriptions of a “black-letter” rule. 
That there may be a point to having some reference to the facts of 
some cases is, of course, a great distance from concluding that contract 
law courses should be made up primarily of the close reading of case 
opinions. Perhaps contract law courses could track treatises, and mostly 
describe the doctrinal rules—for my taste, also adding in some attention 
to how the doctrine developed historically20—but discussing only those 
cases that display in distinctive ways the complexity or uncertainty of 
the rules. 
This analysis also leaves open the question of how the content of a 
course—cases, rules, policy, drafting, negotiation, and so on—should be 
taught. For many of us, what is taught and how it is taught are linked by 
the simple truths of tradition and inertia: we teach the way we were 
taught, and the way that most of our colleagues teach. And for many of 
us that means using some version of the Socratic Method, with 
variations on how much we rely on volunteers rather than “cold calling” 
and the harshness of the responses to unprepared students and bad 
answers. 
A small but growing number of scholars argue that the Socratic 
Method is actually, contrary to what is generally believed, an ineffective 
way of teaching the law.21 This claim is often combined with the 
observation that the uniqueness of this approach to legal education is an 
argument against it, not for it (noting that even when the best 
universities teach their undergraduates and graduate students about 
Socrates, they do not use the “Socratic Method” to do so).22 As the 
argument often continues, we unenlightened law teachers stay with the 
Socratic Method because we are captured by a myth of its effectiveness, 
20. For an argument by example of how such historical material helps us better to understand 
some contract law doctrines, see BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 
4–11, 32–34 (2012). 
21. E.g., Brian Leiter, The “Socratic Method”: The Scandal of American Legal Education, 
LEITER REPORTS: A PHILOSOPHY BLOG (Oct. 20, 2003, 12:15 PM), 
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2003/10/the_socratic_me.html; cf. Andrea P. Goldin et al., 
From Ancient Greece to Modern Education: Universality and Lack of Generalization of the 
Socratic Dialogue, 5 MIND, BRAIN & EDUC. 180 (2011) (in experiment, Socratic Method failed as 
method of teaching mathematical truth that had been used in Plato’s Meno). 
22. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 21. 
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or perhaps just too timid to try something different from the way we 
were taught in law school and different from the way most of our 
colleagues teach. Most of us have had experience with the pushback, and 
sometimes negative student evaluations, that can come with doing 
anything in one’s teaching significantly different from the way students 
in the other sections or even at other universities are being taught. 
The idea behind the Socratic Method is relatively straight-forward, at 
least for those who use the method to teach—rather than primarily to 
intimidate, to use fear of embarrassment to encourage class preparation, 
to obscure simple truths, or to fill out sixty minutes of class with ten 
minutes of material. The positive justification for this Method is that 
students will remember answers better if they reason to them on their 
own, and will get better at (legal) reasoning if they practice the process 
publicly while in class. On the other hand, if students become 
preoccupied with avoiding being called on, or with minimizing their 
embarrassment when they are called on (or when they participate 
voluntarily), this may deflect from learning rather than encourage it. In 
any event, I must leave it to others to offer empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of this method of teaching, with the hope that many of us 
would be willing to change our course if we were shown sufficient 
evidence that other approaches were clearly superior. 
Contracts in the Real World helps us to think through what it is we 
are trying to do as law professors when we teach first-year contract law 
classes, and whether we are going about it the right way. Why do we 
teach through cases rather than simply giving the doctrinal rules, and 
does it really benefit the students for us to try to pretend to be Socrates 
in the Platonic dialogues? 
II. THE BENEFITS OF FULL OPINIONS 
I am not a classical formalist who believes that all that law students 
need to learn can be taught through reading judicial opinions. The 
addition of contract drafting exercises, negotiation exercises, complaint 
drafting work, and so on, to contract law courses clearly reflects skills 
that would be valuable to most, if not all, would-be lawyers. At the same 
time, I do believe that there are benefits from the close reading of 
judicial opinions.23 
There are a variety of benefits to reading full judicial opinions or 
23. These opinions should be both at the trial court and appellate court level; I think the continued 
predominance of appellate court opinions in course-books—likely a residue of the Langdellian 
approach—is a mistake. 
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significant excerpts; I will mention only a few. One matter that I 
emphasize to my contract law students is the importance of the 
procedural posture of a case. There are different standards a court 
applies in responding to a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary 
judgment, a motion for a directed verdict, and a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Similarly, an appellate court 
hearing an appeal will apply different standards of review depending on 
at which stage of the litigation the case was resolved below. These are 
basic points, but I have found that even high-ranked graduates of very 
good law schools seem to miss these basic procedural points in figuring 
out (for example) how to argue a case on appeal. Matters of procedural 
posture are most easily investigated in full opinions, or at least opinions 
where the procedural posture and standards of review have not been 
edited out.24 
Another element that can be missed when one has summarized cases 
rather than full-text opinions is a sense of the struggles of the court, 
working both within and, in a sense, against the existing doctrinal rules. 
For this purpose, the well-known case of Webb v. McGowan25 is a 
classic example. In Webb, an employee had saved his employer from 
death or grievous injury by using his own body to push away a heavy 
falling object, and in the process the employee suffered a significant 
injury. In gratitude, the employer promised the employee regular 
payments until the employee died, and the employer kept that promise 
until his own death, at which point his executor refused to make further 
payments.26 The employee sued to enforce the promise, but the problem 
was that there did not appear to be valid consideration for the employer’s 
promise; the consideration of saving the employer’s life came before the 
24. Of course, in principle one could include the procedural posture of the case and the statement 
of the standard of appellate review even in a brief summary—but once all of that was included, the 
summary would no longer seem so brief, and any benefit in brevity relative to an opinion excerpt 
would likely be lost. 
25. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). The case is also summarized in Contracts in the Real 
World, CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 117–18, but I think that much of its richness is lost in the 
short summary offered.  
26. Of course, students ought also to be told why their cases are full of executors, testatrixes, and 
the like, seemingly always refusing payment on what seem to be legally, or at least morally, strong 
claims. The reason is that executors of estates and trustees of trusts, etc., may be personally liable to 
other beneficiaries if they pay out on claims that are not legally well-grounded. This could lead to 
discussions of whether it would be better to impose liability under a looser standard—for example, 
removing liability where decisions are made in good faith or when claims have a strong moral basis 
even if not legally enforceable. This could take discussion far afield, but that is always a danger 
with contract law courses—they can quickly turn into courses on trusts and estates law, family law, 
employment law, etc.  
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promise rather than at the same time. Contract law was later changed, 
establishing a limited exception to the requirement of contemporaneous 
consideration, to cover cases whose facts were very similar to Webb v. 
McGowan.27 However, that justification was not available to the Webb 
court, which nonetheless struggled to find a way to enforce the promise. 
What makes Webb a great teaching case in my view is that it presents an 
opportunity for students to follow that struggle through the reasoning of 
the court, a struggle that would not be displayed in short summaries of 
the case. 
The Webb court begins its analysis by noting that there is existing 
case law holding that where a person cares for another’s property, this 
can be sufficient to ground a subsequent promise to compensate another 
for the care.28 It then notes that human life similarly has a value, as 
indicated by life insurance and other forms of insurance.29 Within legal 
analysis, one sometimes must deal with legal categories and precedent 
by using analogy and indirection: (1) promises to compensate for earlier 
care for property are enforceable; (2) caring for another person’s health 
and life are like caring for property in that both can have a monetary 
value—as shown by insurance policies; and (3) therefore, promises to 
pay for prior care for another person’s health or life should be 
enforceable. However, the strangest part of the opinion was still to come. 
The Webb court notes that there was some disagreement regarding 
whether or when a prior or existing moral obligation would be sufficient 
consideration to make a promise enforceable, with many courts and 
commentators having held that there must be some existing legal or 
equitable obligation that was for some reason unenforceable.30 The court 
continues: 
[W]here the promisor, having received a material benefit from 
27. At least in the Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) 
(“Promise for Benefit Received”), and followed in many jurisdictions. 
28. Webb, 168 So. at 197. The analysis could have gone in a slightly different direction, and 
noted that emergency care for either person or property has been held to justify actions for 
restitution, even without any subsequent promise to pay. This long-standing principle appears in the 
recent Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment as Sections 20 and 21. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20–21 (2011). However, 
that would have been a more indirect route to showing what needed to be shown here: the 
enforceability of the employer’s promise. 
29. Webb, 168 So. at 197–98. There are also lessons to be learned from the efforts the Webb court 
feels it needs to exert to get to what would seem an obvious point: that life is valuable, value 
potentially expressible in monetary terms, and that contract law should be as willing to enforce 
promises to compensate for benefits to life and health as it should be to enforce promises to 
compensate for benefits to property. 
30. Id. at 198. 
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the promisee, [that promisor] is morally bound to compensate 
him for the services rendered and in consideration of this 
obligation promises to pay. In such cases the subsequent 
promise to pay is an affirmance or ratification of the services 
rendered carrying with it the presumption that a previous request 
for the service was made . . . . McGowin’s express promise to 
pay [the employee] for the services rendered [that is, saving the 
employer’s life] was an affirmance or ratification of what [the 
employee] had done, raising the presumption that the services 
had been rendered at [the employer’s] request.31 
The Webb court thus seems to be telling us that because of the 
employer’s promise to pay, we should presume that there had been a 
remarkably quick and detailed discussion between the employer and 
employee while the heavy object was falling, negotiating the terms of 
compensation for the rescue that was in the process of occurring. This is, 
of course, absurd, but it is an example of a category that all of us who 
read a lot of cases come across regularly: a court using a “legal fiction”32 
or formalistic reasoning to come to a result that the court (and most 
readers) finds to be right or just. Whether such outcome-determinative 
practices by judges is a good thing or a bad thing (or only seems like a 
good thing when the judge reaches an outcome we like) is obviously 
another topic worth discussing with students in any law school course.33 
All of this comes from requiring students to read the actual opinion, and 
question why the court made the arguments it did. 
Complete or nearly complete excerpts of cases also allow the teacher 
to emphasize many other matters: for example, the wonderful brevity of 
Judge Cardozo (as he then was) in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,34 Wood v. 
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,35 and other cases, where every sentence 
displays (or hides) an important step in a packed analysis and argument, 
where doctrine, policy, “common sense,” and rhetoric intermingle 
freely; an example is given in the footnote below.36 There are 
31. Id. 
32. On the nature, value, and uses of legal fictions, see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); 
Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revisited (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904555. 
33. As indicated throughout this article, there are many important topics that could, and perhaps 
should, be raised in a first-year Contract Law course, but there are the countervailing pressures of 
how hard it is to cover the substantive law now that most of us must squeeze the contract law course 
into three or four credits, rather than six credits. 
34. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
35. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
36. One of the questions in Jacob & Youngs is whether the builder was to lose all right to sue on 
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comparable virtues from the more recent Richard Posner opinions, 
which are now starting to populate Contract Law casebooks with almost 
as great a frequency as Cardozo opinions.37 
One last small matter: full opinions allow the teacher to point out to 
the student how every case requires the judge to construct a narrative, 
first and foremost a narrative of what happened (the facts), and that it is 
no coincidence that almost all the factual narratives in judicial opinions 
display the actions underlying the case solely or primarily from the point 
of view of the party that ultimately prevails in that court. The choice of 
point of view is likely not conscious, but it is still important. To narrate 
from the point of view of one party is a natural way to increase the 
reader’s sympathy for that “protagonist.” 
III. CELEBRITY CASES 
I have mixed feelings about the use of cases involving celebrities, 
television shows, and other well-known recent events, as Contracts in 
the Real World does to a great extent, but many course-books do to some 
extent.38 On the positive side, one should not lightly dismiss a strategy 
that could increase interest in a topic many law students find dry and 
dreary. Cases involving actors, athletes, and politicians that students 
recognize may very well increase students’ willingness to pay attention 
to the cases they are required to read. 
One problem is that the fame of the party could distract from the 
doctrinal lesson—that students might be so caught up in liking or hating 
the construction contract (for building a mansion) upon any breach, however small in importance or 
value relative to the remainder of the contract (what would become the doctrine of “substantial 
performance,” in contrast to the “perfect tender” in sale of goods contracts). Cardozo writes: 
From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent of their 
uttermost minutiæ without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion 
that they may not be so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention not otherwise 
revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something 
else is in view, it must not be left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to 
visit venial faults with oppressive retribution. 
Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. A modern judge or commentator would likely unpack those few 
sentences into an argument that went on for many pages. Students accustomed to the lengthier form 
of analysis often get tripped up when trying to work through analysis as compact as Cardozo’s. 
37. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(Posner, J.) (affirming a trial court decision that contract provisions that seem to indicate a 
subjective satisfaction test should in fact be read as imposing an objective satisfaction test), 
excerpted in KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 484–87. For an excellent discussion of the influence and 
contrasting themes of Cardozo and Posner, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A 
Study in Contracts, 36 WM & MARY L. REV. 1379 (1995). 
38. See, e.g., KNAPP ET AL., supra note 3, at 219–24, 1000–09 (cases involving Martin Luther 
King, Jr., and former Minnesota Governor and professional wrestler, Jesse Ventura). 
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Charlie Sheen,39 in wanting him to win or lose the case, that they 
become less able to focus on the intricate questions of conditions 
involved in Sheen’s case. Additionally, today’s celebrity may be an 
obscurity in a short time. It may not be that long before students need the 
help of an internet search engine to figure out who Sheen, Sandra 
Bullock,40 Eminem,41 Kevin Costner,42 or Vanessa Redgrave43 are (we 
are likely already there for some of those figures). 
The other risk of working to be up to date and relevant is that the 
book’s narrative may be overtaken by events. For example, as already 
noted, Contracts in the Real World features a case where a separation 
agreement was challenged because of the parties being mutually 
mistaken about the value of shares in a Madoff Ponzi scheme fund. The 
book characterizes the appellate court as getting the outcome right; 
however, that decision was reversed after the book was finished.44 (Of 
course, being reversed does not mean that the appellate court was 
necessarily wrong, but it does indicate that there were significant 
arguments for a different outcome.)45 
CONCLUSION 
Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World is not only a 
wonderful book about contract law and an excellent teaching tool for 
contract law courses, it is also a good starting place for necessary 
39. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 176–79, 181–86 (discussing case involving Sheen). 
40. See id. at 186–92 (discussing case involving Bullock).  
41. See id. at 126–30 (discussing case involving Eminem). 
42. See id. at 172–76 (discussing case involving Costner). 
43. See id. at 87–88 (discussing case involving Redgrave).  
44. See id. at 59–60, 66 (discussing Simkin v. Blank, 915 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), 
rev’d, 968 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2012)). It should also be noted that the text’s comment that the 
property the married couple were dividing in their separation agreement was “virtually 
all . . . considered jointly owned because it was obtained during their lengthy marriage,” 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 60, misstates the relevant family law principle. In a common law 
property state like New York, which divides property “equitably” upon divorce, each spouse may 
have a claim on an equitable portion of all property obtained during the marriage, but it is not the 
case that all such property was “jointly owned.” See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, FAMILY LAW 153–69 
(2013) (chapter on property division). One other important family law correction: the famous 
“palimony” case of Marvin v. Marvin was decided by the California Supreme Court in 1976, not 
1966, as the book states. Compare Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), with CUNNINGHAM, 
supra note 1, at 47, 223 n.23 (giving the date as 1966). 
45. While the text indicates that the best argument against the outcome in the appellate court was 
the special nature of separation agreements, the decision reversing the appellate court in fact relied 
primarily on a general analysis of contract law mistake doctrine. Compare CUNNINGHAM, supra 
note 1, at 66, with Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 462–65. 
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conversations about how contract law should be taught, and, more 
generally, for when and how cases—in summary form or in longer 
excerpts—are useful in teaching the law. Perhaps the use of full judicial 
opinions (or long excerpts) in course-books is just a practice left over 
from the bad old days of formalism, but this article has tried to offer 
some reasons for thinking that their prevalence may reflect important 
truths about contract law in particular and law and legal education in 
general. 
 
 
